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A Score Card: The First Three Years of Kim Jong Un’s Rule

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Below is an excerpt of a summary of a forum on “A Score Card: The First Three Years of Kim Jong Un’s Rule” which took place December 17, 2014 at the UPF Office of Peace and Security Affairs in Washington, DC. It is based on a presentation and discussion led by Dr. Alexandre Mansourov, Korean affairs specialist and adjunct professor at the U.S.-Korea Institute of SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University.

Brief summary

Domestic score card: The regime is stable, the system is resilient, and the economy is better today than it was three years ago. There is no question that the system of governance in Kim Jong Un’s North Korea is still one-man rule. There is no second-in-command there. Anyone who has tried to assert him- or herself as the second-in-command was cut down in size and eliminated time and again. The North Korean economy is doing better today than three years ago. Reasons may include: (1) growing trade with China and Russia; (2) three years of good harvest; (3) increased domestic construction; (4) increased production of fertilizer; (5) increasing electricity production; (6) consumption “boom”in Pyongyang and in the provincial cities; and, (7) a growing middle class.

International score card: North Korea has been pursuing an emboldened foreign policy including a re-engagement with Japan, expanding trade with China, and rebuilding its traditional ties and partnership with Russia. Regarding South Korea, whether the North has given up on the Park Geun-hye administration remains to be seen. As the South Korean presidential term comes to an end in 2018, some experts predict that Seoul will be increasingly desperate to achieve some progress with the North. The same goes for the Obama administration, which ends in 2017. The U.S. administration may likewise become determined to show some progress for Obama’s two terms of office. The bottom line is that in the past three years, Kim Jong Un has proved to be a survivor, basically using the power of the North Korean system skillfully to his political advantage.

All of the above should be understood against the backdrop that most North Korean experts in the U.S. and South Korea did not even allow the possibility that he would take over, and once he did, they dismissed the possibility that he would stay around for more than a year or two. Now that the three-year mourning period is over, Kim Jong Un is likely to unveil a series of new social-economic policy initiatives and possibly to make some adjustments in the structure of the North Korean system of government, just like it was done by his father who also waited three years after the death of Kim Il Sung before instituting any policy changes and adjustments in the system of governance.

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Summary

Welcoming the participants, Dr. Antonio Betancourt, Director of the Office of Peace and Security Affairs, UPF International, Washington, D.C., said three years have passed since Kim Jong Il died on this very date, Dec. 17, and his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, succeeded him as ruler of North Korea. Today marks the official end of the mourning period for Kim Jong Il. Could the fourth year of Kim Jong Un’s leadership present the possibility of a start of a new era in North-South and U.S.-DPRK relations, considering the recent unilateral release of three American captives and the visit to Pyongyang by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper — or is “there enough evidence to hold Kim Jong Un accountable for massive human rights atrocities comparable to the Nazi-era,” as charged by UN human rights investigator Marzuki Darusman?

Dr. Betancourt put forth a set of questions for the forum. “What has Kim Jong Un accomplished in three years? What has he failed to accomplish? What will he need to do for the future? What are the assessments of inter-Korean relations, and bilateral relations with China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S.? Lastly, what possible innovative solutions will break the logjam in North-South relations, including proposals for a summit between Kim Jong Un and President Park Geun-hye by the 70th anniversary of liberation from Japan next August?”

We offer the following excerpts from Dr. Mansourov, a leading expert on North Korea (DPRK):

“Let me start by giving you my bottom line up front. The regime is stable, the system is resilient, and, believe it or not, the North Korean economy is better today than it was three years ago. The North Korean people have a better life today than they did three years ago when Kim Jong Il died.

There is no question in my mind that we have to deal with one-man rule in North Korea, it is the rule of Kim Jong Un. He is the decider, the modernizer, the commander-in-chief, and the architect-in-chief. He is the person who makes the decisions in North Korea. There is no second-in-command. Anyone who tried to assert him- or herself as a second-in-command was cut down in size and eliminated time and again. I regard all senior officials around Kim Jong Un as basically the pawns of the supreme leader.

There is no collective leadership in North Korea, and no matter what other people may tell you, the people around him can only give him advice. Hence, we have the system of collective advice, but not collective leadership.

Kim Jong Un was able to solidify and consolidate the “unified guidance system” where all reports are directed to him. He maintains control over the country through the key institutions — the party, the military and the security services. Over the past three years, we observed a visible shift from the “Military-First” (Songun) policy, as practiced by his father Kim Jong Il, to the so-called Pyongjin Line, i.e., the strategic course on parallel construction of the economy and nuclear weapons.

We still have to deal with essentially the family-based regime and take into account the first family politics. We saw how ruthless Kim Jong Un could be. He eliminated people perceived as mounting a political challenge to him, those who sought to muscle away the power he had inherited from his father. Jang Song Thaek, his powerful uncle who was married to the only daughter of Kim Il Sung, and was in the shadow of Kim Jong Il for almost 40 years. He did everything to amass his power, including setting up his own private cabinet, his own party within the party, his own security force, and his own reporting line (guidance system) that was meant to enable him to run the country on his own. But, Jang failed to consolidate his power, and, in the end, Kim Jong Un took him out.

Let me make my position clear. Most people say, “What a horrible human being Kim Jong Un is! He took out his own uncle. How could he do that?” In my opinion, Jang’s purge was an act of courage on Kim’s part. Why? Because Jang Song Thaek was a horrible man. His hands were drenched in blood. He was in charge of the North Korean gulag. As the director of the Administrative Department of the WPK Central Committee, he supervised the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of People’s Security, and other principal organizations within the North Korean repressive apparatus. He was the person who signed all execution orders and all the torture orders. He was the North Korean analogue of Stalin’s henchman, Lavrenti Beria, who was chief of the secret police apparatus and administered the Soviet Gulag. Everybody in North Korea knew Jang Song Thaek was a frightening human being. With his removal, North Korean citizens no longer have to live in the fear of arbitrary executions and prosecutions.

In the past three years, Kim Jong Un step-by-step dismantled the guardianship system created by Kim Jong Il to ease his son’s way to power: he removed Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho, Jang Song Thaek, and others. He has solidified his position as the supreme leader by surrounding himself with the people he trusts, including party secretary Choe Ryong-hae and his younger sister Kim Yo Jong, who was recently appointed as vice director of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee’s Propaganda and Agitation Department.

Domestic score card

The North Korean economy is doing better today than three years ago. Because it’s not a transparent system, it’s hard to know why. Three years of good harvests may be a factor, increased civilian consumption, residential construction boom, growing domestic production of fertilizer, a loosening of the strictures of collectivized agriculture, growing number of foreign tourists, increased electricity production. There is a construction boom in Pyongyang and in the provincial cities, business, residential apartments, and roads.

The North Korean economy is recovering slowly. It is also due to the growing trade with China. Despite all the political difficulties, trade with China remains on the uptrend. China is North Korea’s most important ally and trading partner as well as the primary source of arms, energy, and food. In 2013, trade between the two countries grew by more than 10% from 2012 levels to $6.5 billion. A lot of it is not being reported. The economic recovery and social development in North Korea should not be compared to that in South Korea or the West; the benchmark used is the conditions that existed three years ago inside North Korea.

At the same time, North Korea continues research and development work on its nuclear and missile capabilities. They’re spending more on the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. In that sense, their capabilities must be getting better and more sophisticated. Whether the Pyongjin Line of parallel economic construction and nuclear armament is sustainable in the long run nobody knows, but in the past three years it has been working.

The middle class is growing. Obviously, new technology is spreading in North Korea. Generational change is under way and it’s accelerating. These may be the sources for the new policy initiatives in the years to come.

That said, the regime is still very rigid and paranoid. The country continues to be very much isolated, despite increased economic exchanges with China and improved relationships with Russia. Isolation, the oppressive apparatus, the fear and paranoia of the outside world, as well as the regime’s ideological rigidity are all major obstacles to change.

Looking into the future, now that the three-year mourning period is over, I expect Kim Jong Un to unveil a series of new political initiatives and social-economic policy measures, just like his father did in 1998, three years after Kim Il Sung’s death,

Foreign policy score card

We observe that Kim Jong Un’s government has been pursuing an emboldened foreign policy in the past three years. North Korea is rebuilding its traditional partnership with Russia. It has reengaged with Japan. It is basically maintaining a steady economic cooperation with China, despite the fact that the political dialogue is lagging behind.

The question whether the North has given up on the Park Geun-hye administration remains to be seen. Some people say they have given up on her. Others say no. As her presidential term draws to a close by 2018, the North Koreans may try to knock on Seoul’s door once again in the belief that President Park will be increasingly desperate to achieve some progress with the North and with the hope that they can squeeze more concessions from the South. As she becomes more politically vulnerable at home, they will try to raise the price of cooperation.

North Korea continues to threaten the U.S. with nuclear arms, missiles, and cyber weapons.

Have they given up on the Obama presidency? Probably, yes. They may have decided to wait him out or they may try one more time to squeeze some concessions from the United States at the last minute before President Obama leaves office in 2017.

The bottom line is in the past three years Kim Jong Un has proved to be a survivor, basically using the power of the North Korean system skillfully to his political advantage.

This should be understood against the backdrop that most North Korean experts did not even allow the possibility that he would take over and once he did, they dismissed the possibility that he was to stay around for a few years. He keeps beating our expectations.

Look at recent events surrounding the President’s new Cuba policy. This marks the beginning of the end of the communist regime in Cuba because what held the Castro brothers in power for so long was the U.S. embargo and isolation of them. Within five years, there won’t be any communist regime in Cuba. The floodgates have been opened.

North Korea’s biggest fear has never been a nuclear threat from the U.S. What the North Korean leaders probably fear the most is the prospect of the Allies’ lifting all embargoes and sanctions, and re-engaging Pyongyang across the border on all accounts and opening up the North because, if that were to happen, then the Kim regime would lose the rationale for its existence. It will not be able to withstand that kind of influx of Western ideas, capital, and technology.

Let’s hope that the President still has some political capital left to dramatically change his policy towards North Korea in the same way he reversed the decades-long U.S. policy towards Cuba. I’m pessimistic to be honest, especially after his Dec. 19th declaration that North Korea was responsible for the cyber attack against Sony Pictures, but the fact that he reversed the half-century old U.S. policy towards Cuba raises my hopes that something like this could be done with respect to North Korea, too. In my judgment, that would be the beginning of the end of the North Korean regime. Nothing else will work. Increasing international sanctions and isolation, dragging Pyongyang through the mud at the United Nations and ICC will not work. Sanctions and embargoes did not work for the past 60 years. If you keep doing the same thing time and again, why would you expect to see different results? You won’t. The U.S. North Korea policy is no exception.”

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Discussion points

The UN human rights ruling to refer North Korea to the ICC in The Hague for possible charges of “crimes against humanity.” In response, North Korean diplomats met a UN human rights investigator in late October. According to Dr. Mansourov, the North’s agreement to take part in the meeting was unexpected and took the West by surprise. “My position is that we have to engage them in a conversation on human rights. Let’s talk about it. We have to be specific and tell them our concerns. In the past, they refused to talk to us but now they want to talk to us. They’re saying “these are just ordinary prisoners. We know our prison conditions are primitive, but we don’t have the money to keep them up. These are not political prisoners.” I think the burden is on us to keep pushing them to allow us to go in and verify what they’re telling us – whether it is true or not. My impression is that they are responding differently to our human rights initiatives today. “When the North Koreans say they want to be part of the discussion on their human rights at the United Nations, but the Western nations tell them ‘no,’ this is a mistake. The West thinks Pyongyang is bluffing. Instead of shutting them out, the West should use that as an opportunity at the high level to tell them what the Western countries think about their human rights record and to listen to the North Korean point of view.”

Nuclear and missile capabilities. Research and development work continues unabated and that includes their work on the militarization of the nuclear devices making them lighter, more precise, and more diversified. They continue to accumulate fissile material. They haven’t tested a nuclear device for the fourth time despite threatening to do so a few weeks ago. They keep testing rocket engines, important missile components, and this year alone they fired 111 medium-range missiles and short-range missiles 19 times, so clearly it’s a very active testing program.

The charm offensive. The charm offensive will continue with this young leader who wants to go out in the world and present North Korea differently and resolve some of the outstanding issues. “Next year, we’ll see further movement. The first trip I expect to be to Russia. Vladimir Putin has already invited Kim Jong Un to Moscow to mark the USSR’s victory over Nazi Germany on May 9. This would be Kim’s first foreign visit. Putin may return the visit to North Korea on August 15 because it will be the 70th anniversary of the Korean liberation from Japan.”

Japanese abductees. Japanese and North Korean officials held talks in Pyongyang in October regarding the Japanese citizens who were abducted in the 1970s and 80s. Japan believes hundreds were abducted and some may still be alive. Dr. Mansourov says Kim Jong Un wants to see this issue resolved. “He wasn’t even born when it happened. He wants to give them back. Once that is done, he wants to be sure that the Japanese will not change their mind. He’s looking for ways to structure a deal with the Japanese in such a way that they won’t be able to walk away from cooperation under some other excuse (nuclear, missile, human rights, etc.) once they get what they want from Pyongyang on the abductees issue. He doesn’t feel any personal responsibility for the abductions problem. He has given orders to his diplomats to go out and explain the North’s position and resolve the issue. His orders are “Cooperate as much as we can and try to resolve this problem once and for all.”

Divided families. Unfortunately, time is not on our side. Although tens of thousands of people still have relatives in the North, their numbers are dwindling rapidly. By all accounts, in 10 years, there will be no living members of the families that were divided at liberation and during the Korean War on the peninsula. The idea that two Koreas still represent one country because they are united in blood but separated only by ideology will lose ground. There will be no direct blood ties between two Koreas anymore. In essence, only one or two more presidents of the Republic of Korea will have the opportunity to resolve this historical problem and put an end to this long-lasting tragedy of the Korean nation.

Conclusion

Speculation about North Korea has become a routine sport. The reclusive country and tightly controlled media and people continue to worry our government and the experts. But the facts remain, in comparison to three years ago, the North Korean regime is today stable. Kim Jong Un is firmly in command. The economy is recovering and the people are accepting of the legitimacy of his rule and the current status quo. There is no possibility of a coup by the military. North Korea is a resourceful country with a resilient system. On the international arena, the country will be stronger and more assertive in the years ahead. How should the U.S. and the West respond? Should we follow a policy of engagement or isolation? In the view of our speaker and participants, in order to bring about positive change, regime change should not be the objective. Sanctions have not worked for 61 years because North Korea exists in an economic and political world separated from the West. Senior North Korean officials have repeatedly told outsiders that Kim Jong Un will be around for the long term and it is incumbent on the U.S. (as well as Japan and South Korea) to find ways and be open to opportunities to engage them in the international community.

This forum summary excerpted from: http://www.upf.org/peace-and-security/washington-dc-forum/6250-washington-dc-forum-a-score-card-the-first-three-years-of-kim-jong-un-s-rule. Dr. Barry participated by Skype; forum summary prepared by Dr. William Selig with editing by Dr. Barry.

Having No Intention to Solve a Conflict: Thoughts on the Korean Peninsula the Last Few Weeks

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Director of National Intelligence James Clapper’s weekend visit to North Korea is seen by some as a way to inform the North that the U.S. is not prepared to negotiate on larger issues but simply sending a personal representative of the President to retrieve the remaining hostages. It is true that Clapper is not a diplomat per se. But it should be remembered that the first DNI, John Negroponte, subsequently became Deputy Secretary of State. It should also be recalled that the foundational document of inter-Korean relations, the Joint Statement of July 4, 1972, came about because Park Chung Hee’s KCIA chief visited his counterpart in Pyongyang. North Korea likely has greater respect for intelligence chiefs than chief diplomats. One could argue, in a way, that it is more meaningful for the American DNI or Defense Secretary to visit North Korea than it would be for the Secretary of State. Of course, in October 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang, but in return for the visit to the White House of Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, then the second most powerful figure in the North.

As to the visit of the three senior North Korean officials to Incheon early last month — the so-called “North Korean Incheon landing” — it’s astonishing that the promise of such an unprecedented delegation, which included North Korea’s number two figure, could have fizzled so fast. It’s easy to blame the North for reliably being unpredictable and unrealistic in its demands. And it’s also easy to think “What’s the big deal about a bunch of balloons?” flown by South Korean activists for the North to get so upset. But to the North these balloons, which reportedly contained “subversive materials” critical of Kim Jong Un, including DVDs, USB sticks, and even U.S. dollars, understandably provoked an incendiary response. While South Korea could contend it was simply protecting its citizens’ freedom of speech by its non-interference, and only sought to prevent scuffles between local residents and activists, it’s hard to imagine the ROK could not have done more to get the conservative activists to forgo their ballooning to allow the proposed high-level talks, that could have occurred as early as October 30, to proceed. For all her speeches promoting inter-Korean relations and reunification, such as in Washington and Dresden, President Park simply does not appear sincere in practically implementing her vision for a peaceful Korean Peninsula when she can’t or won’t persuade these activists from sending their antagonizing balloons northward. This gets me to the last point.

south-korean-activists-use-balloons-to-launch-leaflets-and-usb-drives-into-north-korea

As I also follow Israel-Palestinian relations quite closely, a common theme with the two Koreas comes up. It boils down to this: rhetoric aside, the preference of Israel and South Korea seems to be to manage a core conflict but not solve it. This means to maintain the status quo and do nothing consequential that would threaten the status quo. Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians since the most recent Gaza war clearly indicates not the slightest intention on Israel’s part to bring about a two state solution anytime in the future. That means all the effort John Kerry put in between July 2013 through April this year shuttling between Jerusalem and Ramallah was for naught because the Israeli government simply put on a charade that it was interested in a two-state solution. But what it really means, from Israel’s bottom-line, is in the Palestinian leadership there is no partner for peace — and probably never will be a Palestinian leadership with which Israel would engage. So Israel was really telling Kerry and his team, “We are for peace and a two state solution” but only with Palestinians who have never and will never exist. Israel’s solution for the Palestinian problem in fact excludes a two-state solution.

“To all those who demonstrate against Israel and in favor of a Palestinian state, I say something simple: I invite you to move there; we won’t give you any problem,” Netanyahu said, during a meeting of the Likud Knesset faction (11/10/14).

There are lots of differences between the Palestinians, who are under military occupation and don’t truly have their own state and defined borders, and North Korea. But certainly South Korea under its present administration seems to have a de facto policy of “it’s better not to solve a problem than solve it.” At best it seems that this South Korean government is waiting for the day when North Korea is on its knees begging to be rescued from its plight than to invest anything that might give a semblance of recognition to the legitimacy of the Kim Jong Un regime. Much as Israel seems to really be saying to the Palestinians, South Korea’s apparent message to the North is “your future will only be under our terms, never yours. What’s to negotiate?” Israel has the military, political and economic power to compel the Palestinians toward their will, and knows as a consequence, it may have to deal with a potential third intifada. But South Korea is dealing with a heavily-armed nuclear North Korea, which time and again has defied predictions of demise or collapse. If the DPRK is probing to come to some sort of accommodation with the ROK, in an uncertain regional environment, the message Seoul sent to Pyongyang by allowing the balloons to fly — at the risk of not holding high-level talks — is of genuine disinterest in changing the status quo.

In both cases, Israel and South Korea take for granted American backing for their de facto policies. How long can that kind of unquestioned backing continue?♦

Caricaturing Kim Jong Il as Irrational after Kim Il Sung’s Death and Toxic Inter-Korean Dynamics

My colleague, Antonio Betancourt, made these valuable points to me about the perception of Kim Jong Il after he assumed power in July 1994, which I have lightly edited:

Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il“In discussing the missed opportunities of the ROK in July 1994, President Kim Young Sam was a victim of the major misinformation machine created by the South Korean government under his administration and previous ones that twisted the image of Kim Jong Il into an unrecognizable caricature, of a leader who was ‘insane’ and did not have the rational capacity to be taken seriously by either the South Korean government or the U.S., China and Russia — of course, although they did not consider Kim Jong Il a brilliant statesman and did not accept the picture painted of him by the ROK. This type of characterization, a caricature of a demon, did not serve in the long run the interests of the ROK or the U.S. Instead, it created the foundation for very difficult and toxic dynamics after Kim Jong Il took power.

The interesting thing is Kim Jong Il surprised both the ROK and the U.S. He proved himself to be a formidable tactician and strategic negotiator behind all the complicated diplomacy that followed his assumption of power in the DPRK following the death of his father, Kim Il Sung. This proved how wrong were all the intelligence reports about him, which were based on a deliberate effort to create an image of a mad, psychotic man with power.”♦

Irredeemable Adversaries and the Conflicts in the Mideast and Korea

israel-gazaOn the side, in recent years, I have followed the efforts to bring about a two-state solution between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Of course, there are numerous differences between the case of Israel and Palestine and that of the two Koreas. Palestinians are a displaced people who want to regain (at least part of) their homeland, and some would be willing to live as two states along with Israel. By tradition, Palestinians are distant cousins of the Israelis, if one traces origins to Abraham’s family.

Although their language and political systems have diverged over nearly 70 years, the two Koreas are one people. There are already two states. In theory at least, these two states want eventually to reintegrate into one.

But it strikes me that what Israel/Palestine and the two Koreas have in common is that no progress toward a two-state solution or reunification can occur when either side, at the core, wishes the other did not exist.

The last three weeks have shown that the conflict between Israel and Palestine seems essentially premised on driving the other out of the region. It is a view of the other as “irredeemable;” therefore you cannot, from that point of view, have viable negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement. You hear: “The Palestinians should move out of Greater Israel and other Arab nations should resettle them;” or, “Hamas’s purpose is to slowly force Israelis to leave their homes and resettle in Europe or the United States so that Palestinians can reclaim their land.”

There is no sense that either people can peacefully live together. There seems to be the underlying belief that neither side can truly trust the other, therefore, the only solution is to reclaim the entire territory for one’s own people.

Thinking about this age-old conflict in the Middle East always brings me back to the unresolved situation on the Korean Peninsula. The song Arirang says “our cherished hopes are for unity” but in reality how can that come about if one side views the other as their crazy cousins whom they want nothing to do with? Instead, the tenor and fundamental premises of the inter-Korean conflict have in fact changed very little since the end of the Korean War in 1953.

What disturbs so many people about Israel’s third military intervention in Gaza is the seeming utter insensitivity and disregard by Israelis for the loss of civilian Palestinian life, including many women and children. It’s not about how successful or not the IDF is in limiting collateral damage; it’s about the inescapable implication that Palestinians are considered less human.

For all of South Korea’s economic successes in recent decades, what has it really achieved if all too many among the South Korean public see the people of North Korea as an issue they just don’t want to deal with? It’s much easier to say the North Koreans are dangerous, would overrun the South if they could, and it’s too expensive to contemplate peacefully integrating them into a reunified Korean state. It is much too convenient to pretend the North Koreans don’t really exist, don’t need to be taken too seriously, and when the time comes, if they have to, the South will have to pick up the pieces when the North collapses.

We don’t know the future of North Korea, but surely, whatever occurs, North Koreans will never forget what South Koreans really thought of them, and if they cared whether or not they existed. We know North Koreans have no choice in how they live. The implications of this prevailing national attitude in the South that has carried over from generation to generation, much like the prevalent Israeli worldview that has carried over about the Palestinians since before statehood, will surely haunt efforts to bring peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula for years to come.

Update: See “When dead children have no names: Israel’s terrifying descent into numbness,” Haaretz, August 3, 2014

Update 2: See “At 90, a former Foreign Service officer looks at Gaza then, and now,” Los Angeles Times, August 8, 2014

A Range of Options for the ROK in July 1994

Korean crisisAs a brief follow-on to my recent article in NK News (picked up by The Guardian), here’s a range of options for President Kim Young Sam how he could have publicly reacted to the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, with whom he would have met in a summit 17 days later, rather than his government labelling the North Korean leader a war criminal and prohibiting any expressions of condolences:

  • As ROK Drop suggests, Kim Young Sam could simply have stayed quiet; no negative or positive statements. Like Google’s motto, “do no evil.”
  • He could have extended pro forma condolences, much like President Bill Clinton and others. This of course would have meant allowing condolences from the public, but still prohibiting visits to the North by ROK citizens.
  • He could have permitted a private sector delegation composed of the chairmen or presidents of those chaebol that already had business ties with the North.
  • Kim Young Sam could have sent a mid-level delegation to Kim Il Sung’s state funeral, perhaps led by a vice Unification minister or vice foreign minister.
  • He could have sent the Prime Minister, Unification Minister or Foreign Minister to the funeral. The trip could have been but a few hours, not requiring an overnight stay or any political consultations.
  • In the above three instances, the ROK could have permitted on a case-by-case basis private delegations (religious or otherwise) going to the funeral if their representation was balanced.
  • Kim Young Sam could have gone to the funeral himself, taking a gamble at a unique historical opportunity to engage the North through Kim Jong Il, and aggressively build on that opportunity. He could have stayed overnight and held consultations with DPRK officials the next day. Had he done so, he would have had the public backing of the U.S.♦