Having No Intention to Solve a Conflict: Thoughts on the Korean Peninsula the Last Few Weeks

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Director of National Intelligence James Clapper’s weekend visit to North Korea is seen by some as a way to inform the North that the U.S. is not prepared to negotiate on larger issues but simply sending a personal representative of the President to retrieve the remaining hostages. It is true that Clapper is not a diplomat per se. But it should be remembered that the first DNI, John Negroponte, subsequently became Deputy Secretary of State. It should also be recalled that the foundational document of inter-Korean relations, the Joint Statement of July 4, 1972, came about because Park Chung Hee’s KCIA chief visited his counterpart in Pyongyang. North Korea likely has greater respect for intelligence chiefs than chief diplomats. One could argue, in a way, that it is more meaningful for the American DNI or Defense Secretary to visit North Korea than it would be for the Secretary of State. Of course, in October 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang, but in return for the visit to the White House of Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, then the second most powerful figure in the North.

As to the visit of the three senior North Korean officials to Incheon early last month — the so-called “North Korean Incheon landing” — it’s astonishing that the promise of such an unprecedented delegation, which included North Korea’s number two figure, could have fizzled so fast. It’s easy to blame the North for reliably being unpredictable and unrealistic in its demands. And it’s also easy to think “What’s the big deal about a bunch of balloons?” flown by South Korean activists for the North to get so upset. But to the North these balloons, which reportedly contained “subversive materials” critical of Kim Jong Un, including DVDs, USB sticks, and even U.S. dollars, understandably provoked an incendiary response. While South Korea could contend it was simply protecting its citizens’ freedom of speech by its non-interference, and only sought to prevent scuffles between local residents and activists, it’s hard to imagine the ROK could not have done more to get the conservative activists to forgo their ballooning to allow the proposed high-level talks, that could have occurred as early as October 30, to proceed. For all her speeches promoting inter-Korean relations and reunification, such as in Washington and Dresden, President Park simply does not appear sincere in practically implementing her vision for a peaceful Korean Peninsula when she can’t or won’t persuade these activists from sending their antagonizing balloons northward. This gets me to the last point.

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As I also follow Israel-Palestinian relations quite closely, a common theme with the two Koreas comes up. It boils down to this: rhetoric aside, the preference of Israel and South Korea seems to be to manage a core conflict but not solve it. This means to maintain the status quo and do nothing consequential that would threaten the status quo. Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians since the most recent Gaza war clearly indicates not the slightest intention on Israel’s part to bring about a two state solution anytime in the future. That means all the effort John Kerry put in between July 2013 through April this year shuttling between Jerusalem and Ramallah was for naught because the Israeli government simply put on a charade that it was interested in a two-state solution. But what it really means, from Israel’s bottom-line, is in the Palestinian leadership there is no partner for peace — and probably never will be a Palestinian leadership with which Israel would engage. So Israel was really telling Kerry and his team, “We are for peace and a two state solution” but only with Palestinians who have never and will never exist. Israel’s solution for the Palestinian problem in fact excludes a two-state solution.

“To all those who demonstrate against Israel and in favor of a Palestinian state, I say something simple: I invite you to move there; we won’t give you any problem,” Netanyahu said, during a meeting of the Likud Knesset faction (11/10/14).

There are lots of differences between the Palestinians, who are under military occupation and don’t truly have their own state and defined borders, and North Korea. But certainly South Korea under its present administration seems to have a de facto policy of “it’s better not to solve a problem than solve it.” At best it seems that this South Korean government is waiting for the day when North Korea is on its knees begging to be rescued from its plight than to invest anything that might give a semblance of recognition to the legitimacy of the Kim Jong Un regime. Much as Israel seems to really be saying to the Palestinians, South Korea’s apparent message to the North is “your future will only be under our terms, never yours. What’s to negotiate?” Israel has the military, political and economic power to compel the Palestinians toward their will, and knows as a consequence, it may have to deal with a potential third intifada. But South Korea is dealing with a heavily-armed nuclear North Korea, which time and again has defied predictions of demise or collapse. If the DPRK is probing to come to some sort of accommodation with the ROK, in an uncertain regional environment, the message Seoul sent to Pyongyang by allowing the balloons to fly — at the risk of not holding high-level talks — is of genuine disinterest in changing the status quo.

In both cases, Israel and South Korea take for granted American backing for their de facto policies. How long can that kind of unquestioned backing continue?♦

Caricaturing Kim Jong Il as Irrational after Kim Il Sung’s Death and Toxic Inter-Korean Dynamics

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My colleague, Antonio Betancourt, made these valuable points to me about the perception of Kim Jong Il after he assumed power in July 1994, which I have lightly edited:

Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il“In discussing the missed opportunities of the ROK in July 1994, President Kim Young Sam was a victim of the major misinformation machine created by the South Korean government under his administration and previous ones that twisted the image of Kim Jong Il into an unrecognizable caricature, of a leader who was ‘insane’ and did not have the rational capacity to be taken seriously by either the South Korean government or the U.S., China and Russia — of course, although they did not consider Kim Jong Il a brilliant statesman and did not accept the picture painted of him by the ROK. This type of characterization, a caricature of a demon, did not serve in the long run the interests of the ROK or the U.S. Instead, it created the foundation for very difficult and toxic dynamics after Kim Jong Il took power.

The interesting thing is Kim Jong Il surprised both the ROK and the U.S. He proved himself to be a formidable tactician and strategic negotiator behind all the complicated diplomacy that followed his assumption of power in the DPRK following the death of his father, Kim Il Sung. This proved how wrong were all the intelligence reports about him, which were based on a deliberate effort to create an image of a mad, psychotic man with power.”♦

Irredeemable Adversaries and the Conflicts in the Mideast and Korea

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israel-gazaOn the side, in recent years, I have followed the efforts to bring about a two-state solution between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Of course, there are numerous differences between the case of Israel and Palestine and that of the two Koreas. Palestinians are a displaced people who want to regain (at least part of) their homeland, and some would be willing to live as two states along with Israel. By tradition, Palestinians are distant cousins of the Israelis, if one traces origins to Abraham’s family.

Although their language and political systems have diverged over nearly 70 years, the two Koreas are one people. There are already two states. In theory at least, these two states want eventually to reintegrate into one.

But it strikes me that what Israel/Palestine and the two Koreas have in common is that no progress toward a two-state solution or reunification can occur when either side, at the core, wishes the other did not exist.

The last three weeks have shown that the conflict between Israel and Palestine seems essentially premised on driving the other out of the region. It is a view of the other as “irredeemable;” therefore you cannot, from that point of view, have viable negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement. You hear: “The Palestinians should move out of Greater Israel and other Arab nations should resettle them;” or, “Hamas’s purpose is to slowly force Israelis to leave their homes and resettle in Europe or the United States so that Palestinians can reclaim their land.”

There is no sense that either people can peacefully live together. There seems to be the underlying belief that neither side can truly trust the other, therefore, the only solution is to reclaim the entire territory for one’s own people.

Thinking about this age-old conflict in the Middle East always brings me back to the unresolved situation on the Korean Peninsula. The song Arirang says “our cherished hopes are for unity” but in reality how can that come about if one side views the other as their crazy cousins whom they want nothing to do with? Instead, the tenor and fundamental premises of the inter-Korean conflict have in fact changed very little since the end of the Korean War in 1953.

What disturbs so many people about Israel’s third military intervention in Gaza is the seeming utter insensitivity and disregard by Israelis for the loss of civilian Palestinian life, including many women and children. It’s not about how successful or not the IDF is in limiting collateral damage; it’s about the inescapable implication that Palestinians are considered less human.

For all of South Korea’s economic successes in recent decades, what has it really achieved if all too many among the South Korean public see the people of North Korea as an issue they just don’t want to deal with? It’s much easier to say the North Koreans are dangerous, would overrun the South if they could, and it’s too expensive to contemplate peacefully integrating them into a reunified Korean state. It is much too convenient to pretend the North Koreans don’t really exist, don’t need to be taken too seriously, and when the time comes, if they have to, the South will have to pick up the pieces when the North collapses.

We don’t know the future of North Korea, but surely, whatever occurs, North Koreans will never forget what South Koreans really thought of them, and if they cared whether or not they existed. We know North Koreans have no choice in how they live. The implications of this prevailing national attitude in the South that has carried over from generation to generation, much like the prevalent Israeli worldview that has carried over about the Palestinians since before statehood, will surely haunt efforts to bring peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula for years to come.

Update: See “When dead children have no names: Israel’s terrifying descent into numbness,” Haaretz, August 3, 2014

Update 2: See “At 90, a former Foreign Service officer looks at Gaza then, and now,” Los Angeles Times, August 8, 2014

A Range of Options for the ROK in July 1994

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Korean crisisAs a brief follow-on to my recent article in NK News (picked up by The Guardian), here’s a range of options for President Kim Young Sam how he could have publicly reacted to the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, with whom he would have met in a summit 17 days later, rather than his government labelling the North Korean leader a war criminal and prohibiting any expressions of condolences:

  • As ROK Drop suggests, Kim Young Sam could simply have stayed quiet; no negative or positive statements. Like Google’s motto, “do no evil.”
  • He could have extended pro forma condolences, much like President Bill Clinton and others. This of course would have meant allowing condolences from the public, but still prohibiting visits to the North by ROK citizens.
  • He could have permitted a private sector delegation composed of the chairmen or presidents of those chaebol that already had business ties with the North.
  • Kim Young Sam could have sent a mid-level delegation to Kim Il Sung’s state funeral, perhaps led by a vice Unification minister or vice foreign minister.
  • He could have sent the Prime Minister, Unification Minister or Foreign Minister to the funeral. The trip could have been but a few hours, not requiring an overnight stay or any political consultations.
  • In the above three instances, the ROK could have permitted on a case-by-case basis private delegations (religious or otherwise) going to the funeral if their representation was balanced.
  • Kim Young Sam could have gone to the funeral himself, taking a gamble at a unique historical opportunity to engage the North through Kim Jong Il, and aggressively build on that opportunity. He could have stayed overnight and held consultations with DPRK officials the next day. Had he done so, he would have had the public backing of the U.S.♦