

cept the challenge to build a finer Army, we must preserve the fundamental qualities which have made our Army great. The commitment of selfless service to our country that these qualities represent is the principal reason our profession is truly a way of life rather than just a job.

For the man who has dedicated his life to his country and inspired many others to do the same, history will find a place among its heroes. Today the Congress of the United States and a grateful country offer him a sincere expression of thanks.

INTERVIEW WITH KIM IL SUNG

HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 27, 1972

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, June 26, Washington Post carried an article and interview by correspondent Selig S. Harrison with North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung. In response to questions submitted in advance, Kim said he would be willing to meet with South Korean President Park Chung Hee, "If he desires to meet me," and expressed a willingness to negotiate directly with South Korean authorities on mutual troop reductions and eventual peaceful reunification of North and South Korea.

Specifically, if the South Koreans are ready to negotiate, North Korea would propose a mutual evacuation of military personnel and installations from the demilitarized zone and a mutual reduction in armed forces by 150,000 to 200,000. North Korea would then propose a peace agreement providing for a further mutual reduction in forces down to 100,000 or fewer, and guarantees for the eventual peaceful reunification of the North and South by elections or transitional confederation. The implementation of the agreement would be conditioned upon complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. Kim explicitly rejected any international or third-party supervision of the military reductions or withdrawals or elections. He went on to say that the U.N. could assist in the reunification by revoking all resolutions which obstruct the peaceful reunification, and by abolishing the U.N. Commission for the Reunification and Rehabilitation of Korea—also an obstacle to reunification, according to Kim.

Yesterday, our State Department issued a cautious "wait-and-see" response to the Kim interview, saying:

Concrete actions are always a more meaningful indicator of a government's intentions than statements to newspaper correspondents.

Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that those concrete actions will be forthcoming. It is true that there has often been a disparity between what is proposed to journalists and other third parties, and what is actually presented officially through diplomatic channels. Whether Kim's proposals represent an honest trial balloon or simply a diplomatic decoy, we are not in a position to judge at this time. Only

time and diplomatic followthrough will tell.

I would hope that Kim is sincere about his avowed desire to ease tensions between the North and South and to get on with negotiations to effect this. Obviously, a logical first step would be to conclude an agreement on the humanitarian issues now being discussed in the Red Cross talks, including the reunion of divided families.

If this new spirit of conciliation proves to be genuine, I think it can be attributed in large part to the overtures and initiatives taken by President Nixon in relaxing tensions with the Communist world by his journeys for peace to Peking and Moscow. While we should not be euphoric about the prospects for instant peaceful coexistence, I think Kim's apparent new stance is but one more indicator that President Nixon's efforts are paying off indirectly as well as directly.

I include in the RECORD the Harrison article and interview from Monday's Post, and the article from Tuesday's Post on the State Department reaction. The articles follow:

[From the Washington Post, June 26, 1972]

KIM SEEKS SUMMIT, KOREAN TROOP CUTS

(By Selig S. Harrison)

PYONGYANG, June 21.—Premier Kim Il Sung of North Korea said today that he is willing to meet President Park Chung Hee of South Korea for summit talks on a major new plan to demilitarize the buffer zone along the Panmunjon armistice line and reduce the armed forces of the North and South by between 150,000 and 200,000 men.

"If the South Korean authorities are ready to have negotiations with us, face to face, we intend to advance various new proposals," the premier said in an interview.

"To begin with, we consider it possible to evacuate military personnel and installations of the two sides from the Demilitarized Zone under an agreement between the two sides with a view to easing tension."

North and South Korea are now in a confrontation "fraught with the danger of a war breaking out if the trigger is pulled," he added, "and to relax such a war atmosphere, I think they can reduce their armed forces by 150,000 men respectively under an agreement between the two sides. It would be still more gratifying to reduce by 200,000 men respectively."

This would be followed by a "no war" agreement between North and South, he said, and finally by mutual troop cutbacks to a common level of 100,000 men or fewer "on the condition that U.S. forces are withdrawn from South Korea."

Asked whether he would be willing to meet President Park personally for a discussion of these issues, Premier Kim replied that "I can meet him if he desires to meet me." Gesticulating and waving a cigarette, alternately frowning and grinning expansively, the premier spoke for 80 minutes in response to a list of questions negotiated in advance. He then entertained several impromptu questions, ending the interview by proposing a toast of Korean-made champagne to "friendship between the Korean and American peoples."

The premier's proposals went far beyond previous North Korean peace gestures to the South and underlined Pyongyang's new readiness to pursue a relaxation of tensions with Seoul despite the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea.

This also marks the first time Kim has explicitly indicated his readiness to meet Park, long reviled here for prewar service to

the Japanese colonial regime while a military officer in Manchuria and for his alleged subservience to the United States in recent years.

Until January, North Korea treated the withdrawal of U.S. forces as a precondition for conclusion of a "no war" agreement with the South. Kim offered then to discuss a peace pact with "South Korean authorities" pending a U.S. pullout. But he did not offer specific interim proposals for force reductions in the absence of a U.S. withdrawal, and he spoke of a single jump from existing troop levels to reduced forces of 100,000 if U.S. troops were removed.

Now the premier has added two new preliminary negotiating proposals for discussion with the South without insisting on a prior U.S. withdrawal. Both of these proposals embody new approaches to a North-South accommodation.

TALKS WITH SEOUL

By proposing talks with Seoul on the removal of military installations from the Panmunjon truce zone the premier has attempted to brush aside two decades of angry recriminations over alleged violations of the armistice agreement in which Pyongyang has been pitted against the United Nations.

In effect, Pyongyang is not against demilitarizing the buffer zone but wants to link this with the larger objective of unification by reaching an understanding directly with the South rather than with U.S. officers under the U.N. flag.

An equally important objective of bypassing the U.N. Command and the military armistice commission at Panmunjon for direct dealings with Seoul would be to undermine the entire status of the United Nations in Korea. Pyongyang could argue that North-South talks invalidate past U.N. resolutions on Korea and make further U.N. presence unnecessary.

The 2.5-mile-wide truce area was originally conceived in the 1954 Korean armistice as a demilitarized buffer zone but has been the scene of continual armed clashes. Both sides have accused the other at various times of introducing illegal fencing, fortifications and weaponry on its side if the military demarcation line running through the middle of the buffer area.

Ironically, the former senior member of the U.N. Command, Maj. Gen. F. M. Rogers, told a newsman following his departure from Korea last year that "it is time for Koreans to talk to Koreans" at Panmunjon.

But the idea was quickly disowned by Washington and received coolly by South Korean leaders.

"Kim has made no effort to gloss over the fact that both North and South have 'military installations' within the Demilitarized Zone. 'Now, both sides have many military personnel and military installations in the Demilitarized Zone,' he said. 'The tense situation there will be eased if these military personnel and military installations are removed.'"

By offering to reduce North Korean forces by 150,000 to 200,000 men in return for corresponding South Korean reductions, Pyongyang has agreed to retain the present military balance pending an overall agreement bringing both sides down to common levels of 100,000 or fewer.

ARMED FORCES

The best available estimates suggest that the South has 672,000 men in its armed forces, including its troops in South Vietnam, while the North has slightly fewer than 400,000. Kim's offer would appear to envisage maximum reductions leaving North Korean strength at roughly 200,000, while the South would retain its present superiority with 472,000.

Seoul has often dismissed North Korean proposals for troop cutbacks by charging that Pyongyang maintains 1.3 million men in parttime "worker-peasant-student Red

Guard" militia units far more intensively trained than the South's own "homeland Reserve."

The premier anticipated this response by volunteering that "if necessary, the civil defense forces can also be reduced in the future under the agreement of the two sides."

The proposals today followed a major breakthrough last week in 10-month-old talks at Panmunjom between Red Cross officials of North and South on the reunion of divided families. After months of stalemate, the two sides agreed on the agenda for full-dress talks to be held in Pyongyang and Seoul.

Predicting that the talks would be held "at an early date," the premier said that "a door, though narrow, had been opened between the North and South which have remained separated for a long time. So both sides value this very much. Although the talks progress slowly, their prospect is very bright."

The interview was notable for a relative lack of anti-U.S. invective, by North Korean standards.

At one point, he volunteered that "when the American people joined the common front against Fascism and fought against the Hitlerite Fascists and Japanese imperialism during World War II they won high praise and support from the Korean people. The subsequent aggravation of relations between Korea and the United States is attributable to United States intervention in the internal affairs of Korea and its hostile and aggressive policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

This takes some of the sting out of the propaganda charge greeting an American visitor here that "U.S. imperialism has been the sworn enemy of the Korean people for more than a century."

Kim is presented in national museums as the liberator of his country from Japanese rule. Only passing credit is given to the Soviet role here at the end of World War II, and no mention is made of the American defeat of Japan, which the premier indirectly acknowledged in his statement today.

"We Korean people distinguish the American people from the U.S. imperialists," said the premier, "and the Korean people wish to promote friendship with the U.S. people not only now but also in the future."

EXCHANGE OF NEWSMEN

Past North Korean statements on "people to people" relations have stressed that Pyongyang would bar all official contacts with the United States until American troops were withdrawn from Korea.

In response to a question, the premier said that if North Korean journalists are ever invited to Washington, he would not be "opposed to our journalists meeting with U.S. officials if an opportunity is afforded."

Since leading publications and journalists here speak for the state or for the ruling Workers Party, this appears to open the way for semi-official contacts.

The premier also said that he would "have no objection to establishing trade and economic relations with the U.S., but would welcome it" if U.S. troops are withdrawn from Korea.

He said he also looks forward to trade with Japan "if they want it."

U.S. THREAT

Kim sidestepped a question about whether he saw growing differences between Japan and the United States and rated either of the two countries as a greater threat to Korea than to the other. He repeated previous statements lumping "the U.S. imperialists and the revived Japanese militarists" together and said that "as for the contradictions between Japan and the United States, I think the Americans or the Japanese know them better than we."

Reaffirming his stand that the United Nations should withdraw its umbrella for the U.S. military presence in Korea, he urged that the U.N. should annual resolutions branding North Korea as the aggressor in the Korean War and dissolve the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

In a slight softening of the tone of past attacks on the U.N., he urged that the world body "should take measures helpful to the reunification of Korea now that all the people in North and South Korea aspire to the reunification of the country and a tendency toward peaceful unification is surging high among them."

Although he did not elaborate on what "measures" he had in mind, he made an oblique reference to a possible change in the status of U.S. troops in Korea by suggesting that it is "high time" not only to dissolve UNCURK, but also "to take the caps of the 'U.N. forces' off the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea under the cloak of the 'United Nations.'"

Kim spoke animatedly about the benefits that would flow from reduced defense spending in the event of a "no war" agreement, mutual force cutbacks and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

"The people would be greatly benefited by this," he said. "If defense spending is cut to 5 or 7 per cent in the state budget and the expenses thus released are spent on raising the living standards of the people in the future, our people will be benefited much more by it than now. Demobilized veterans could participate in the labor front, and this will bring us several times greater returns than the benefits we get in terms of state budgetary disbursement."

"With a greater number of young and middle-aged people participating in the labor front, we will be able to construct more and extract more natural wealth. More factories and more dwellings will be built. We have still a lot to do."

The interview was held in a corner of the vast audience room of the cabinet building, located in the center of a lightly guarded complex of government office buildings on the edge of central Pyongyang.

A phalanx of aides was present, including the secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party and the editor of the Workers Party organ, Rodong Shinmun.

A hefty, commanding man with puffy cheeks and penetrating eyes, Kim wore tortoise shell glasses and a dark gray suit with a coat suggestive of a Mao jacket.

He smiled confidently, almost smugly, and spoke with theatrical pauses, wrinkling his brow, raising his eyebrows periodically, settling back jauntily after marking a point that he liked.

The premier turned 60 on April 15, but his wavy black hair is intact and has only a few gray streaks around the ears.

Kim has ruled North Korea since 1945 and is near the top of the list among world leaders for longevity in office.

This was the second interview the North Korean leader has given to an American correspondent. Pyongyang was completely closed to American newsmen until last month.

[From the Washington Post, June 26, 1972]

TO RELAX A WAR ATMOSPHERE

(NOTE.—The following is a partial transcript of the interview of North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung by Washington Post correspondent Selig S. Harrison.)

KIM. I am sorry to have kept you waiting for me for a long time. I would have received you earlier if we had been able to meet before my departure on an official mission to local areas. But something unexpected prompted my departure. Various matters

kept me there longer than anticipated. These reasons prevented me from meeting you earlier. I would like to ask you excuse me for this. We have been looking forward to meeting you as you have come here through the introduction of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan. Do you feel in good health after your stay in our country?

HARRISON. Yes, I have received excellent hospitality, and I am most grateful for the opportunity I have had to visit factories, cooperative farms and other institutions in various parts of your country. I am glad to see that you have completely recovered and have made substantial progress.

KIM. Thank you, I have seen your questions. You seem to want me to answer you, avoiding a repetition of what I have said in my previous interviews. In my talk with you, I will try to avoid repeating what I have said earlier, so I have no choice but to begin by touching upon our future work. After all, you American newsmen come here to know all our future policies.

PEACE ACCORD

To begin with, I would like to answer you briefly about the questions of concluding a peace agreement between the North and the South in this country, reducing armed forces of both sides and improving the relations between the North and the South.

As you know, the North and the South had had no contacts due to their long partition before they made the first contact last year through the talks between the representatives of the Red Cross organizations of the North and the South. Later, however, the South Korean authorities declared a "state of emergency." This made the situation tenser in our country.

If the South Korean authorities had wanted to behave properly, they should have striven to ease tension since the North and the South were beginning contacts after a long separation. But they aggravated tension by declaring the "state of emergency."

The important thing today is how to relax the tension created in the country. We have proposed on many occasions to conclude a peace agreement between the North and the South, but it has not yet been concluded owing to the refusal of the South Korean authorities. We have been making all possible efforts to ease this tense situation. We think that by relaxing tension, we should also be able to make the South Korean authorities dispel misunderstanding toward us and prevent them from threatening, blackmailing and suppressing the South Korean people, inventing lies regarding our "southward aggression."

If the South Korean authorities are ready to have negotiations with us, face to face, we intend to advance various new proposals.

To begin with, we consider it possible to evacuate military personnel and military installations of the two sides from the Demilitarized Zone under an agreement between the two sides with a view to easing tension.

DMZ FORCES

Now, both sides have many military personnel and military installations in the Demilitarized Zone. The tense situation there will be eased if these military personnel and military installations are removed.

To proceed, the two sides are now in a situation fraught with the danger of a war breaking out if the trigger is pulled, and to relax such a war atmosphere, I think, the North and the South can reduce their armed forces by 150,000 men respectively under an agreement between the two sides.

It would be still more gratifying to reduce by 200,000 men respectively. In my opinion, this will enable us to avoid the danger of a possible war. The above-mentioned are new proposals. I am telling you about our new

proposals of which no mention has been made so far.

Next, in order to relax tension in our country, I think it necessary to conclude a peace agreement between the North and South which affords a guarantee for peacefully reunifying the country and against resorting to use of force. When the peace agreement is concluded, the U.S. troops must pull out of South Korea. When the peace agreement is concluded, the danger of war will be removed, and accordingly there will be no more pretext for the U.S. troops to stay on in South Korea, and we propose that the armed forces of the North and the South should be reduced to 100,000 or fewer respectively, on the condition that the U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea.

REDUCTION OF TROOPS

If the armed forces of the North and South are reduced to 100,000 or fewer respectively under the conditions that a peace agreement is concluded and the U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea, then it will provide a firmer guarantee for the peaceful reunification of our country.

The civil defense forces, if necessary, can also be reduced in the future under the agreement of the two sides.

I think these are some steps we are going to take for the peaceful reunification of our country. These problems cannot be solved through the Red Cross talks between the North and the South. These problems, I think, should be solved through negotiations between the authorities of the North and the South or through negotiations between the deputies of our Supreme People's Assembly and the members of the National Assembly of South Korea.

Besides, to remove the misunderstanding and distrust between the North and the South, it is necessary, I think, for the representatives of the political parties and public organizations embracing broad sections of the masses and the personages of the political circles to travel and make contact with each other and hold bilateral or multilateral negotiations.

NARROW DIFFERENCES

By so doing, in my view, we can raise concrete problems for narrowing down the differences of views existing between us and achieving the peaceful reunification of the country. I believe the reunification of our country should on all accounts be achieved by the Korean nation itself without the interference of any outside forces on the principle of national self-determination and on a democratic principle.

The peaceful reunification of the country can be attained by way of establishing a unified government through the elections to be held throughout the whole of Korea or by setting up a confederation system as a transitional step.

The elections we demand should be free elections without the interference of any outside forces. It is desirable to set up the unified government through democratic elections based on universal direct principles and principles of equality.

But if the unified government cannot be set up right away, it may be good, as well, to achieve the reunification through a confederate system slowly, leaving the present systems in the North and the South intact. In this way, the reunification of the country may be realized gradually. We think to settle all the problems for the peaceful reunification of the country, it is necessary first of all to achieve a great unity of the nation, transcending the differences of systems, belief and political views, and for this purpose, it is essential to remove misunderstanding and distrust between the North and the South and create an atmosphere of mutual understanding, respect and trust. This is our contention.

As for other problems, I have referred to them on other occasions before. I will say no more about them. Can you understand me well?

HARRISON. I am very much interested in your statement. The question of the reduction of armed forces, in particular, is worthy of study. May I ask you a question to have a clearer understanding of what you have proposed? In cutting back the armed forces of North and South, do you mean to reduce the forces of the two sides by two stages, that is, by 150,000 or 200,000 men, respectively, at the initial stage and later to reduce them to 100,000 men or fewer at the second stage?

KIM. Yes, we mean to reduce the armed forces of the North and South to fewer than 100,000 men, respectively, at the second stage under the condition in which a peace agreement is concluded between North and South and U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea.

HARRISON. Would you be prepared to meet President Park Chung Hee of South Korea to discuss such problems?

KIM. I can meet him if he desires to meet me.

You asked me how to improve the relations between Korea and the United States. I would like to make a few remarks on this matter. As for the relations between Korea and the United States, the U.S. government must not meddle in the internal affairs of Korea.

It should not encourage the division of our country but help its reunification. In order not to hinder the reunification of our country, it should first of all withdraw its troops from South Korea and should not make any aggressive threat against us. Then the relations between the United States and our country can be improved soon, I believe.

I will not relate the long history of U.S. aggression against Korea because time does not permit me to do so. When the American people joined the common front against Fascism and fought against the Hitlerite Fascists and Japanese imperialism during the Second World War, they won high praise and support from the Korean people. Subsequent aggravation of relations between Korea and the United States is attributable to the United States intervention in the internal affairs of Korea and its hostile and aggressive policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

If the United States gives up its hostile and aggressive policy towards us even now and does not encourage the division of Korea or obstruct the reunification of Korea, we are also ready to change our policy towards the United States. We Korean people distinguish the American people from the U.S. imperialists.

The Korean people wish to promote friendship with the U.S. people not only now but also in the future. Then you ask me about the relations between Japan and the United States and my view as to . . . growing contradictions between Japan and the U.S., and you asked me which of the two countries . . . poses a greater menace to the Korean people.

The political program of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea states that we will promote friendship and solidarity with those countries which want to establish relations of equality and mutual benefit and express goodwill towards us, but we cannot show goodwill towards such countries as treat our country with hostility and inequality and adopt an aggressive policy against . . . Therefore, we think both the U.S. imperialists and the revived Japanese militarists are dangerous forces to us.

U.S. POLICIES

The relations between our country and the United States or Japan depend on what

policies the government of the United States or the government of Japan would take towards our country.

As for the contradictions between Japan and the United States, I think the Americans or the Japanese know them better than we.

As regards the question on Korea and the United Nations which you asked, I think the United Nations should strive to help the Korean people in their endeavours to realize the peaceful reunification of the country. The United Nations should take measures helpful to the reunification of Korea now that all the people in North and South Korea aspire to the reunification of the country and a tendency towards peaceful reunification is surging high among them. In other words, it should revoke all the resolutions which obstruct the peaceful reunification of Korea, that is the resolutions which encourage the division of Korea.

The Korean nation wants to achieve reunification of its country. So the obstacles in the way of its reunification should be removed, shouldn't they? It is high time to dissolve the "United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea," an obstacle to peaceful reunification, and to take the caps of the "U.N. forces" off the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea under the cloak of the "United Nations."

WANT TO NEGOTIATE

The Korean people want to negotiate and won't fight among themselves, so there is no need for the United Nations to "super-vise." The Korean people desire peaceful reunification, and the North and the South are making contacts and doing efforts to realize free travel and why is the "United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" necessary and what necessity do the U.S. troops have to remain in Korea under the signboard of the United Nations and play the role of police? Such obstacles should all be removed, I think.

Korea's unification should be achieved on the principle of national self-determination and no one can meddle in the internal affairs of Korea.

You can find new proposals here, too. . .

To tell something about the North-South Red Cross talks, the Red Cross talks are going on well. There had been arguments on the question of the agenda of the full-dress talks but a full agreement was reached on the agenda some time ago. A door, though narrow, has been opened between the North and South, which have remained separated for a long time. So both sides value this very much.

We think the full-dress talks between the representatives of the North and South Red Cross organizations will be soon convened. The entire people of North and South Korea are all looking forward to it. Though the talks progress slowly, their prospect is very bright.

You asked me about the question of our journalists visiting the United States. We have no objection to it. We have no objection to sending our journalists to the United States nor are we opposed to our journalists meeting with the U.S. officials, as you asked, if an opportunity is afforded.

You asked me to express my view on the visits of Nixon to Peking and Moscow. We will only watch how Nixon is going to translate into practice the statements he made during his visits to Peking and Moscow and the joint communiques announced there.

I think I have answered all your questions. Have you any more questions to ask.

HARRISON. I would like to ask several clarifying questions. The first one is related to your comments on the United Nations. You have previously said, as you did today, that it was necessary for the United Nations to dissolve the "United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea."

Yet you have said that there are also new proposals in your comments today. Could you clarify these?

KIM. I think it is important first of all for the U.N. to desist from any act of creating obstacles to the reunification of Korea and annul all resolutions hampering the reunification. The United Nations refuses to deal with both sides equally and interferes in the internal affairs of Korea. It is evident that it hampers Korea's unification, isn't it?

HARRISON. You have said before that if South Korea would abrogate its military pacts concluded with foreign powers your country, too, would abrogate its military treaties concluded with foreign countries. Would this happen in the foreseeable future in your concept or in the long term? Do you propose it as part of negotiations between the North and the South or after the conclusion of a peace agreement between the North and the South or at the stage of the confederation?

KIM. That should be agreed upon by the North and the South. In my opinion we can abrogate all these treaties if they hinder the reunification of our country. It is not a matter of the present stage, but a matter to be settled in the future under the agreement by the both sides. The question as to which of the military treaties is necessary and which is not may be discussed when the country is reunified in a peaceful way. I think it is possible to nullify whatever is standing in the way of peaceful reunification if both sides agree to do so even now.

So much for the answers. Lastly, you asked me whether I have any words to ask you to convey to the American people upon your return home. Please convey to the American people my hope that they will unite with the Korean people and the peace-loving people of the world to fight against wars of aggression and wage a common struggle so that all may live in peace. The people, be it Korean or American, always want to promote friendship. Our people have had sentiments toward the United States. These bad feelings are directed toward the U.S. imperialist aggressors and the reactionary U.S. government, but not toward the U.S. people.

I am pleased with your long stay in our country and I am grateful to you for having waited for me patiently. I regard this as a manifestation of your trust for us.

[From the Washington Post, June 27, 1972]
UNITED STATES WEIGHS KIM'S BID; EXPERTS VOICE INTEREST

(By Ronald Koven)

The State Department officially characterized its reaction yesterday to North Korea's new detente proposals as "wait and see."

Privately, however, specialists expressed much interest in North Korean leader Kim I Sung's proposals, in an interview with The Washington Post, to demilitarize the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas and to reduce the rival Korean armies without evening out the present military imbalance in favor of South Korea or insisting on an immediate U.S. military withdrawal.

For the record, U.S. officials said, in State Department spokesman Charles Bray's words, "Concrete actions are always a more meaningful indicator of a government's intentions than statements to newspaper correspondents."

Other officials said they had such "concrete actions" in mind as ceasing the construction of fortifications inside the DMZ and halting infiltration into the South.

Bray pointed out that demilitarization of the DMZ "appears on the face of it to be quite similar to a proposal that has already been made several times, I believe, by the United Nations Command and, independently, by the Republic of Korea.

"The North Koreans have always rejected this idea. But it is one that is on the table. We shall have to wait and see what North Korean intentions in this regard are," he added.

At another point, Bray rejected the suggestion by North Korean leader Kim I Sung that Northern journalists should visit the United States.

The cool U.S. official reaction to the Kim proposals was apparently at least partially related to reluctance to upstage any reaction by South Korea.

U.S. officials said that any diplomatic follow-through would have to be conducted by Seoul, and that it seemed unlikely that the South Koreans would move until Pyongyang communicates its proposals directly.

There seemed to be general agreement in Washington that Kim's making his proposals publicly through non-Korean journalists at least raised questions about his sincerity.

Some officials professed to be confused about Kim's true position. They noted that he dropped a U.S. military withdrawal from Korea as a precondition for political progress between the two Koreas when he spoke with Japanese journalists in January, but that he reintroduced that demand several weeks ago in an interview with Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times.

When speaking more recently with Selig S. Harrison of The Washington Post, Kim again dropped the condition.

But some specialists said Kim's proposal on the DMZ seemed on the surface to provide a basis for agreement. They were also intrigued by Kim's willingness to reduce armed forces in a first stage on a one-for-one basis by between 150,000-200,000 men.

A 200,000-man reduction would leave the North with about 200,000 under arms and the South with about 470,000.

Among the pressures on Kim at least to appear more accommodating analysts here said, are that his belligerence has been counterproductive and that China, Pyongyang's chief ally, has been preaching rapprochement with the United States both by example and in diplomatic contacts. Kim is also said to be convinced that he would win out in any peaceful political competition with the South.

SALT—NEXT STEP IN DISARMAMENT

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 27, 1972

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, Gen. Thomas S. Power, in "Design for Survival," said:

It is, therefore, up to the American people to decide which road to survival they want to choose. The choice is by no means easy. The active proponents of one-world government have a very salable product to sell—peace without arms race—and they are both vocal and convincing. . . . Unfortunately, however, our approach—survival through military supremacy—ostensibly entails far greater sacrifices and risks, and therefore has less appeal to those who seek a quick and easy way out. Still, it is the only approach which will permit national survival. This is the approach we have followed to this day, and it has proved successful. . . . *The two approaches permit of no compromise* because they point in exactly opposite directions. Therefore, in making their choice, our citizens must select the one or the other, realizing that once they have chosen the road to disarmament and one-world government, there can be no turning back.

The principal features of the SALT arms limitations agreements made in Moscow between the United States and Soviet Russia, and soon to be presented to both Houses of Congress, are summarized as follows by a select group of Senators including BARRY GOLDWATER and JAMES BUCKLEY:

The Moscow agreements freeze the U.S. at a 4 to 1 disadvantage comparing our overall missile payload to that of the Soviet Union;

The Soviet Union has three missiles for every two of ours, theirs are substantially larger, and the agreements guarantee that this gap will remain and probably widen;

Soviet missiles carry payloads several times larger than those of U.S. missiles, an advantage which the agreements not only protect, but allow to be enhanced;

The agreements forbid the U.S. to increase the number of its nuclear submarines while authorizing the Soviets to continue building them until they equal and then surpass the United States.

On the House floor recently some fiscal conservatives were trying to cut appropriations to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I raised the question: For what purpose are we supporting a Disarmament Agency in any form? The fact is that since 1962 we have been engaged in formal disarmament negotiations in Geneva, conducted by this Agency, always with the stated purpose of "the total elimination of all armed forces and armaments except those needed to maintain internal order within States and to furnish the United Nations with peace forces." It is significant to note that Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1962 under a Democratic administration when these negotiations began, reappears 10 years later under a Republican administration as a leading big-name negotiator of the SALT agreements. Reducing American Armed Forces to a level of permanent inferiority to the Soviets is a long step toward the kind of disarmament sought since 1962, most likely to be followed, once accomplished, by a push to limit U.S. arms to the point that they are inferior to those of the United Nations as well.

Such disarmament is buying national suicide on the installment plan. Last year Gen. Curtis LeMay, former Air Force Chief of Staff and founder of the Strategic Air Command, warned that if present trends to arms limitation continue, this country can look forward within 18 months to some type of ultimatum from our principal arms rivals. Even the disarmament-prone New York Times pointed out in an editorial June 5:

That [Soviet] edge includes 40 percent more intercontinental ballistic missiles (1408 to 1000), and missile-launching submarines (62 to 44), one-third more submarine-launched ballistic missiles (950 to 710) and a three-fold Soviet advantage in megatonnage of total missile payload. Much of this appears in writing in the five-year agreement freezing strategic offensive missiles.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird admitted a year ago that "we have been in a period of almost moratorium since 1967 on new strategic weapons deployment" while noting in the May 4, 1972, issue of Commander's Digest that we are "in a period of vigorous Soviet military expansion at sea, on the land, in the air, and in space."