My early 2020 written interviews on North Korea

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I am again quoted in the February 16, 2020 China Newsweek, this time on the appointment of Ri Son-Gwon as the new DPRK Foreign Minister:

Original Chinese:

​李善权:谈判“暴躁”的朝鲜新外相

English machine translation:

https://www.translatetheweb.com/?from=ab&to=en&a=https%3A%2F%2Fmp.weixin.qq.com%2Fs%2Fi9V31iuBcfRYHMpyWIC1ow

Many thanks again to writer Ran Cao for his detailed report. Here are my full comments as submitted by email on Jan. 31:

“Ri Son-gwon’s new role as FM in itself has little impact on U.S.-DPRK relations because he is unlikely to ever get personally involved in negotiations. Rather Madam Choe and her people will continue to manage the process, because Ri’s predecessor also did not get involved in this special aspect of DPRK foreign policy. Life-long Foreign Ministry professionals are important for North Korea because they are the only people trained to deal with their international counterparts in the manner of government-to-government relations. Ri’s appointment, as a military man and former righthand to Kim Yong Chol, could be a signal that North Korea intends to safeguard its nuclear program and not negotiate it away unless the U.S. were to remove its sanctions upon the North — a most unlikely scenario. Figures like Ri wear multiple hats: most have military ranks and occasionally wear uniforms, but they are primarily party people, since that remains Kim Jong Un’s base of power; the military and government are secondary to the party to him.

“We need to see prospects for U.S.-DPRK negotiations in 2020 with the new perspective of Trump’s assassination of Iran’s General Suleimani and offer of a non-starter peace deal to the Palestinians in January (seen as a plan that seeks their capitulation). Kim Jong Un, perhaps rightly so, may have already concluded that Trump will never make a deal where he appears to be weak or cave in, and that he is unpredictable. Trump also does one-shot deals, not interim deals; that’s his character. Therefore, despite the fact that Trump will survive impeachment and is likely to be reelected, the personal relationship with Kim, which is all that survives right now, is not a sufficient basis to move forward. Kim surely is saying to his generals that the only way the U.S. will respect North Korea is to retain a nuclear capability that will prevent unilateral action by the U.S.; it is the “great equalizer” for an otherwise weak country whose dependence on China is only increasing. After reelection, we will see what Trump will do, but right now, he seems capable only of either breaking deals or of imposing deals or conditions on those who are too weak to resist or object.”

Also, on January 21, I was one of 12 North Korean specialists surveyed by Radio Free Asia’s Korean Service on likely North Korean behavior towards the U.S. and South Korea in 2020. These were the 12 interviewed, in my case by Dukin Han:

1. Amb. Robert King
2. Thomas Countryman
3. Harry Kazianis
4. Mark Tokola
5. Frank Aum
6. David Maxwell
7. Ken Gause
8. Bruce Bennett
9. Andrei Lankov
10. Mark P. Barry
11. Kyle Ferrier
12. Henri Feron

Original Korean:

[북 다음 행보 긴급설문] 미 전문가들 “저강도 도발 이어질 듯”

English machine translation:

https://www.translatetheweb.com/?from=ab&to=en&a=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fkorean%2Fin_focus%2Fnews_indepth%2Fne-jn-01212020150247.html

Although I was not quoted in the posted article above, some of my comments were later included in a RFA Korean radio broadcast about the survey which was not posted online. Here are my full comments as submitted by email in mid-January (pre-coronavirus):

“The fact that President Trump conveyed birthday greetings, through the visiting ROK National Security Advisor, to Kim Jong Un in early January indicates that the core relationship still exists, which both sides don’t wish to break. U.S.-DPRK negotiations cannot begin until Trump’s impeachment trial is over. But after acquittal, the President would be somewhat more free to pursue improved relations with North Korea while the Democratic primaries continue from February through June.

“At this point, Kim has refrained from any new provocations, perhaps at China’s restraint, although that can’t last forever. In any case, I don’t think North Korea would be ready to alter its position at all at least until around the time it celebrates Kim Il Sung’s birthday on April 15, at the earliest. However, the U.S. has not lifted any sanctions (although enforcement tends to be spotty), and even introduced two new sanctions in mid-January. The only way North Korea can hold out is to continue to receive major economic support from China while finding ways to circumvent sanctions and seeking new sources of income.

“However, overall, North Korea believes it is urgent to improve relations with the U.S. in order to counterbalance enormous Chinese pressure to engage more closely with China, which could lead to progressive loss of DPRK sovereignty in 2020 and beyond, as China, in my view, would ideally prefer to integrate the DPRK economy into its own and reduce the North’s ability to conduct foreign policy without Chinese approval.”♦

Photo above: Newly-appointed DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Son-Gwon.

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