Full 15-post thread unroll via Skyview, summarizing the political analyses of Saturday’s major South Korean newspapers, here.♦

Photo at top: Lawmakers of the ruling People Power Party protest to South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Woo Won Shik, above, during a plenary session for the impeachment motion against South Korean acting President Han Duck-soo at the National Assembly in Seoul, South Korea, Dec. 27, 2024.

Photo at top: President Yoon Suk Yeol bows in apology to the South Korean public during a press conference at the presidential office in Seoul on Dec. 7.

This photo (and video) of Ahn Gwi-ryeong, 35, a spokesperson for South Korea’s opposition Democratic Party, grabbing the weapon of a soldier outside South Korea’s National Assembly building after the Dec. 3 declaration of martial law, has been shared widely online. BBC story here.

Photo at top: Soldiers try to enter the National Assembly building in Seoul on December 4, 2024, after South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law at 10:25 pm KT on Dec. 3.

Photo at top: Kim Jong Un meets President Trump at the MDL in Panmunjeom on June 30, 2019.

On November 21, I was a guest, along with Dr. Kim Young-jun, Professor at the National Security College, Korea National Defense University, on Arirang News’ “Within the Frame” public affairs program to discuss North Korea, Russia, and Ukraine after Ukraine’s expanded use of U.S.-made ATACMS missiles. We also discussed Kim Jong Un’s recent speech to KPA battalion commanders in which he expressed fear of a “third world war.” Many thanks to host Kim Mok-yeon for her questions.

Here is the video:

Photo at top: Kim Jong Un attended a military hardware exhibition, Defence Development-2024, in Pyongyang on Nov. 21.

On October 30, I was a guest, along with Dr. Go Myong-hyun, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy, on Arirang News’ “Within the Frame” public affairs program to discuss North Korea and Ukraine. Many thanks to host Kim Mok-yeon for her questions. Here is the video:👇🏻

I was also a guest on Oct. 28 on BeFM radio’s flagship “Morning Wave in Busan” program, interviewed by host Katherine Bang on the same topic. I thank her for allowing a very broad discussion.

Here is the video segment:👇🏻

In both interviews, I tried to convey that, absent an incontestable landslide victory on Election Day for Kamala Harris, Donald Trump will simply declare himself President-elect up-front, well before all votes are counted (which may take days or weeks), asserting he has the emphatic backing of the American people, and he may imply he is the “Acting President” who must now, in effect, run the country because President Biden, allegedly, is no longer capable to (despite the upcoming APEC and G20 summits this month he’s expected to attend).

Trump may then begin to conduct a parallel foreign policy to that of the Biden/Harris administration from Trump Tower or Mar-a-Lago well before the final election outcome is known, with phone calls to Putin, Netanyahu and other world leaders.  This possibility will severely test American democracy, in the midst of North Korean troop deployment in the Ukraine war. Trump is increasingly “psychologically preparing Americans for an assault on the electoral system, a second January 6,” even if he knows he’s lost.♦

I was interviewed last night for Arirang News’ “On Point” segment on its morning news program, “New Day,” and discussed North Korea’s demolition of its roads by the two rail lines to South Korea; the apparent flight of drones over Pyongyang; the failure of continuity in foreign policy over successive administrations in both the U.S. and South Korea; the DPRK alliance with Russia (including recent sending of North Korean troops to fight in the war against Ukraine); and the North’s fraught relations with China. None of this bodes well for North Korea’s future. Many thanks to anchor Kim Da Mi for her questions and the opportunity to speak at some length.

Below is the full interview:

And below is a lightly edited transcript:

“On Point” segment, New Day, 10 a.m. KST, Arirang News, Oct. 16, 2024

Host: Now, let’s delve deeper into North Korea’s intentions behind the latest display of anger. We’re joined by Dr. Mark P. Barry this morning. Welcome back.

Barry: Good morning. Happy to be back again.

Host: What does it mean to blow up roads along the Gyeongui and Donghae rail lines which connect to [South] Korea?

Barry: Roads are a means of goods being transported, and it means not even humanitarian supplies are going to be sent north in the future because the roads that were occasionally used are no longer connected.

So basically, it’s still symbolic, but it doesn’t distract North Korea from its other priorities, whether domestic or its alliance with Russia.

And as we know, the North already blew up the inter-Korean liaison office more than two years ago, and that railway links had begun dismantlement, I believe, last May.

But in my view, the ongoing leaflet balloons from the South have been a big cause of this because Kim believes they’ve been encouraged by the ROK government.

And although it’s unclear who sent the recent drones to Pyongyang, the evidence is that they originated from the South, whether they be from NGOs or the government or maybe a combination of the two.

But we should caution that Hamas for years was sending incendiary balloons over the fence in Gaza into Israel. And look where things are today. So this is a very, very dangerous tactic that’s going on.

Host: Well, Dr. Barry, let’s talk more about the symbolic significance the happening carries. Why is North Korea symbolically then destroying inter-Korean relations that have been slowly built up?

Barry: My view is that, and I keep emphasizing this over and over again, this reflects a lack of continuity in foreign policy in both the U.S. and in South Korea between successive administrations.

So just as Obama warned President-elect Trump in November 2016 that his biggest foreign policy headache was North Korea, President Trump should have conceded the [2020] election, believe it or not, and offered to connect President Biden to Kim. I mean, that’s what we used to call continuity in foreign policy.

And frankly, I think President Yoon would have been much better off to maintain even clandestine direct communication with Kim from 2022, because it would have showed his respect for Kim’s decision in 2018 to improve relations with South Korea. But that perceived lack of direct respect towards Kim has contributed to this problem.

Host: Well, Dr. Barry, you know, trash-carrying balloons, like you mentioned, drones carrying propaganda leaflets, and now blowing up roads. When will these provocation happenings actually stop? I mean, is there any chance all these will come to an end after the U.S. elections next month?

Barry: I think Kim is making permanent his cutting of ties with the South, and he’s doing it before the next [U.S.] president takes office. But there’s no guarantee we’re going to know the winner in the few days after the election. It took 36 days in the year 2000 between Gore and George W. Bush.

So in my view, it’s less a stunt than a declaration of a new status quo, and it makes it easier for North Korea to conduct its relations as its own, you might say, unique state.

And it’s communicating, in effect, that it’s lost the inter-Korean competition.

So its only choice is to cut off from the South and discard all notions of unification, even though that may not be what its populace actually feels.

And so the U.S. election outcome is going to have little influence on Kim right now, even if Trump were to win.

And that’s because, again, in my view, Kim is no longer fully free to act internationally because he’s in part beholden to Putin as Putin’s junior partner.

Host: Well, you know, Russia is backing North Korea’s persistent claim of drone incursions by South Korea, and Putin is submitting a bill to ratify Russia’s strategic agreement with the North. What is behind Pyongyang-Moscow deepening military ties right now?

Barry: The treaty that is being discussed in the Duma, which was in outline form agreed between Kim and Putin in June, Peskov, the spokesman for the Kremlin, says that the treaty is “unambiguous” on mutual defense, but frankly it’s subject to interpretation. And, it’s really up to Putin’s interpretation, because he’s the senior partner.

So job number one for Kim Jong-un right now is to not disappoint Putin and deliver the goods, whatever he asks for.

And that includes sending several thousand troops who, according to Ukrainian intelligence, [though] being Korean, are being dubbed “Buryats.” Buryatia is a Russian [republic] just north of Mongolia. They’re of Mongolian-related background. And so they’re basically calling the North Korean troops “Buryat” brigades.

So Kim is now Putin’s contractor, and at all costs he has to succeed where Putin expects him to. And if Kim fails Putin, he’s going to be thrown under the bus and abandoned.

And Putin may then leave it to President Xi to have his way with North Korea. And Xi will find ways to constrict Kim through dependence and subordinating North Korea’s economy and foreign policy to China’s needs.

So basically, I’d say Kim Jong-un, his back is to the wall.

Host: Well, we cannot not talk about China here. You know, Pyongyang-Beijing ties appear to be not as tight as Pyongyang-[Moscow] relations. Now, do you think China will remain quiet about the recent escalating tensions here on the Korean Peninsula?

Barry: It’s part of a larger picture of Chinese relations with the Russians.

And of course, the new Russian defense minister met with a senior Chinese military official, I believe just yesterday. They’re communicating on all sorts of security-related matters.

But for Kim Jong-un, he met President Xi five times, the last time in June 2019. But that’s over five years without face-to-face contact.

But Xi’s end goals are more for DPRK subordination, recognizing China’s superior status.

But from Kim’s point of view, he knows this means progressive loss of North Korean independence and sovereignty.

And that’s why he reached out to Putin last year, because Russia’s war in Ukraine, after about a year, was stalemated.

Since Kim could no longer pursue counterbalancing enormous Chinese pressure with ties to the U.S. under the newly-elected President Biden, this became his only option, to improve ties with Russia and do what Russia asks of him.

So this is likely Kim’s final effort to forestall what could be tragic consequences for the North in the not-too-distant future, where it could de facto lose its sovereignty and independence, although nominally be its own state.

Host: All right, Dr. Barry, thank you so much for joining us and also for sharing your insights with us this morning. We appreciate it.♦

Photo at top: Kim Jong Un attends what KCNA called a national defense and security council meeting on Oct. 14.

The U.S. Presidential Election and Future American Policy toward North Korea

Dr. Mark P. Barry

Associate Editor Emeritus, International Journal on World Peace

[Bullet points prepared for delivery at an international forum at the Lotte Hotel, Seoul, Korea, Sept. 4, 2024]

• I’m a native New Yorker who has followed Donald Trump’s career through the media since the early 1970s. Many New Yorkers like myself can fairly confidently say, “We know this guy. We know how he thinks and behaves,” and we can apply that experience to what’s happening in 2024.
• The most important fact is that Trump almost never accepts advice from others (although he can certainly appropriate ideas from others as his own). He makes his own decisions, even when his National Security Advisor, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense are all in the room telling him otherwise (as H.R. McMaster recounts in his new book).
• Don’t listen to what so-called Trump spokesmen visiting Korea (or when you visit Washington) might tell you about future Trump policies if he is re-elected. They don’t speak for Trump, and, in fact, that they say they reflect his views almost surely guarantees he’ll throw them under the bus in the future.
• Regardless of what you hear or read, keep several things in mind:
  • The 2020 election was decided by only about 47,000 votes in the key battleground states. That determined the Electoral College outcome, which is why both campaigns are feverishly working in the key swing districts of the seven battleground states.
  • Polls regularly undercount those likely to vote for Trump as many respondents won’t admit they plan to vote for him. But if you listen to conversations at diners and coffee shops, you can feel the strength of his support. Where I live 100 miles north of New York City, just days after the first presidential debate in which Biden did so poorly, I heard a group of diners in a restaurant confidently boast that this time Trump is going to win New York and New Jersey, normally reliably blue states. Though this was said prior to Biden withdrawing his candidacy, their point was the animus by a large group of voters toward Democrats is so strong that Trump could decisively win.
  • Trump most likely will showed up for his September 10 presidential debate in Philadelphia. It may or may not be the only Harris-Trump debate, depending on outcome. But early voting will nonetheless begin by mid-September.
  • New York State Judge Juan Merchan, after ruling on Sept. 16 whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on presidential immunity shields Trump, will decide whether to re-schedule Trump’s sentencing, currently set for Sept. 18, in his hush-money trial conviction. Since the Manhattan district attorney has deferred to the judge on a sentencing delay, while maintaining further delay is unnecessary, the judge may will postpone sentencing until after Nov. 5, partly to avoid the appearance of election interference as well as to allow the defense time to digest his ruling on immunity. But the judge may only postpone sentencing until early October: an October surprise. [Update: On Sept. 6, the judge postponed Trump’s sentencing, if necessary, until Nov. 26, while the immunity ruling is rescheduled for Nov. 12.]
  • Outside factors: If there is not a ceasefire soon in the war in Gaza, then it’s possible Iran and Hezbollah will again escalate attacks against Israel, which will involve the U.S. and could go on for weeks or months. Harris would see a drop in poll numbers not only among Arab-Americans in Michigan but American Jews as well, while Trump will claim he would have never let these things happen.
  • If the election desks of major media call the presidential election for Harris late on election night or the morning after, Trump’s campaign and the Republican Party, as has been well-reported by The New York Times and other news organizations, is fully prepared to challenge the vote-counting at the county level in the key battleground states through the state and federal judicial systems. We will see echoes of both 2020 and even 2000, where at best, the Supreme Court may again have to decide the election, and at worst, several states could be unable to certify their electoral votes, creating a constitutional crisis.
  • If the election is projected for Vice President Harris on Nov. 5-6, the two months between Nov. 6 and Jan. 6 will be a very contentious and uncertain period for the United States.
• In short, Donald Trump does not plan on conceding if he loses, and he will put relentless legal pressure on the American judicial system to be declared the winner by January 6, 2025.
• Turning to the Koreas: If Trump is re-elected, he will largely ignore Biden Administration policies toward both Koreas, and institute his own, especially after he likely meets President Yoon in a Washington visit in spring 2025.
• However, first Trump will focus on ending the war in Ukraine by demanding that both Putin and Zelensky agree to a ceasefire quickly leading to a settlement. He will pressure Ukraine with threats of an end to all future arms shipments.
• Afterwards, he may tell Putin he wants to bring about a reduction in tensions on the Korean Peninsula and he asks for the Russian president’s active cooperation.
• When Trump meets Yoon, he will likely say inter-Korean tensions have become parlous since 2021 — and would not have occurred if he had been president (something Trump has told Korean audiences by video since late 2021). Trump would inform Yoon that current ROK policy greatly exacerbates tensions with Kim Jong-un and has to stop.
• He will urge Yoon to make the determination, and requisite effort, to meet with Chairman Kim Jong Un and find a way to get along.
• Moreover, Trump may tell Yoon that he is willing to make a deal with Kim, and let him keep a few nuclear weapons and only short-range missiles, in exchange for the U.S. ceasing all military exercises with the ROK, and possibly commencing a major American troop drawdown over four years.
• Trump will likely tell President Yoon that “Korea is a rich country and you’re selling the latest weapons around the world. You no longer need U.S. troops on your soil and I have to save American taxpayers money. So I intend to draw down the numbers of our troops over four years and maybe leave just a few hundred there permanently.”
• If Kamala Harris becomes President, she will initially continue Biden administration policy, and so inform President Yoon when they meet, presumably by spring next year. This includes trilateral cooperation with Japan, as begun at the 2023 Camp David summit.
• A President Harris would continue backing Ukraine in the short-term, but within her first year in office, we should expect a multilateral push for a settlement between Russia and Ukraine, which would be driven by domestic political sentiment in the U.S.
• In the Middle East, if Harris succeeds in re-shaping Israeli behavior toward Gaza and the West Bank (depending on whether Biden leaves office with a permanent ceasefire and hostage release in Gaza), and gets new Israeli leadership to publicly commit to an eventual two-state solution, she may then focus on how she can foster permanent peace on the Korean peninsula after over 70 years of a technical state of war.
• Given that so much has changed since the Korean Armistice took effect in 1953, as the first woman U.S. president, and rather than continuing to merely manage the conflict, Harris could push for a comprehensive peace settlement in Korea, including a multilateral peace agreement, along with arms control measures and security guarantees.
• However, it’s hard to see her focusing her energies on Korean peace until at least midway in her term, after the 2026 midterm elections, and possibly after a new president takes office in the ROK in May 2027.
• Her biggest challenge will be managing relations with China, along with her vice president, Tim Walz. She may need to carry out a sequel to Nixon’s 1972 efforts to separate China from Russia.
• We are in a decisive period of history, I believe even more decisive than the hugely eventful period of July-August 1945 that had such long-lasting impact upon the Asia-Pacific.♦

Photo at top: U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris meets ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol on Sept. 29, 2022. She is now the Democratic Party candidate for President in 2024.